Those limits are not based on complexity. There is no practical difference between a dispute involving $29,000 and one involving $290,000.

Both rely on the same facts, the same evidence and the same common-sense reading of what happened.

When a dispute goes even slightly over the cap, the tribunal cannot hear it.

That single rule forces people into the courts. That means higher fees, long delays and legal costs that often exceed the value of the dispute.

Many people simply give up.

In practice, the cap protects one group more than anyone else: lawyers.

Every case that cannot go to the tribunal becomes another potential income stream for an industry that thrives on slow, paper-heavy processes.

The public might assume that courts are designed to find the truth and deliver a fair result.

Retired High Court judge Sir John Hansen put it plainly: “Our adversarial system is not designed for that.”

Hansen, who served as a judge for 27 years, saw firsthand how civil cases turn into exercises in endurance and expense rather than fact-finding.

What the system is designed to do is generate billable hours.

Procedure, delay, adjournments and paperwork are not side effects. They are revenue.

Every extra letter, affidavit or hearing is profit.

Inefficiency is not an accident of the system. It is the system.

This is why alternatives like the Disputes Tribunal work so well.

You turn up, explain the issue, and a referee, an independent decision-maker appointed by the court, asks questions and resolves the matter. No lawyers. No endless filings. Just facts and fairness.

Arbitration is sometimes promoted as an alternative, but arbitration run by lawyers mimics the same court process and usually costs more.

The timetable stretches. The paperwork grows. The meter runs.

When lawyers are in control, efficiency is the first casualty.

A few years ago, there was a chance to change this.

While Andrew Little was Minister of Justice, the judicial Rules Committee began an “Improving Access to Civil Justice” project.

One idea under discussion was simple: Allow judges to take a more inquisitorial, hands-on role in civil cases.

Versions of this model already operate overseas. They are faster, cheaper, and more focused on the truth.

The idea never made it off the page.

There was no public fight. No government rejection. It just slid off the table.

The Rules Committee went quiet. The New Zealand Law Society murmured about “complexity”.

The New Zealand Bar Association warned about “standards”.

Then the door closed, softly and quietly, the way doors close when people with power prefer that nothing changes.

No one needs to say out loud that a streamlined, judge-led process would reduce billable hours.

The economic threat speaks for itself. A faster, clearer, less adversarial process would take away the inefficiencies that the legal business treats as essential features.

Efficiency threatens income. Justice delivered quickly threatens income. Predictable court processes threaten income.

In New Zealand, reforms rarely explode. They suffocate.

Meetings, consultation papers, polite concerns and silence do the work. Time is the most reliable weapon against change.

Sir John Hansen warned that we need to “immediately consider whether the adversarial system is the most cost-efficient and fair way of meeting litigants’ expectations”.

He was right. Few New Zealanders can now afford to take a civil dispute through the courts. Most never file at all.

Those who persist often find the process more punishing than the original problem.

This is not because civil disputes are complex. It is because the system has been shaped around the business needs of lawyers, not the public’s need for justice.

The Disputes Tribunal shows that a better model already exists. It is simple, fast and fair. It works. The cap does not.

For many cases, the tribunal delivers the kind of justice New Zealanders expect the courts to provide.

If both parties agree, the tribunal should be allowed to hear disputes of any size.

Larger claims could pay higher fees on a user-pays basis. No one expects taxpayers to subsidise big commercial cases.

But people should be free to choose an efficient forum.